II. Kant’s Misunderstanding of Berkeley

But what of Kant’s arguments that his transcendental idealism is opposed to Berkeley’s immaterialism? It is commonly argued that Kant’s misguided disparagement of Berkeley can be traced to his misunderstanding of the Irishman’s philosophy, which he seemed to believe amounted to little more than a form of pure subjectivism (Carus 175-176). It is also commonly argued that had Kant understood Berkeley correctly he would have acknowledged the fact in his Critique of Pure Reason (Walker 109). In an attempt to explain Kant’s misunderstanding of Berkeley many scholars point to the fact that Kant’s grasp of the English language was sorely inadequate and that no German translations of Berkeley’s works were available prior to Kant’s publication of the Critique (Turbayne 114). These scholars also generally assume that Kant’s knowledge of Berkeley must therefore have been based upon second-hand accounts which tended to dismiss him as a mere mystic (Turbayne 88).

Although a seemingly tenable hypothesis, it can also be argued that Kant was well acquainted with Berkeley’s ideas and indeed that he borrowed from them liberally in the formulation of his own philosophy (Turbayne 115). This position is supported not only by the striking similarity between Berkeley’s immaterialism and Kant’s transcendental idealism, which will be demonstrated later, but also by recent historical research. According to Turbayne, although many scholars have held that Kant could not have read any of Berkeley’s writings prior to his publication of the Critique because of a lack of any German translations, modern scholarship has revealed the existence of a German translation of Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, and of a Latin translation of Berkeley’s De Motu, which predate Kant’s Critique by at least 25 years (Turbayne 88-90). In order to explain Kant’s distancing of himself from Berkeley, Turbayne points out that Kant’s animosity toward all whom he considered mystics would have rendered it impossible for him to acknowledge Berkeley’s influence (Turbayne 114-115).

Although many scholars deny the relevance of Kant’s arguments against Berkeley based on his obvious misunderstanding of the latter’s position, it is still only fair that they be addressed. R.C.S. Walker, in his essay entitled Idealism: Kant and Berkeley,. responds to several of Kant’s arguments. According to Walker, Kant attempted to differentiate himself from Berkeley by arguing that whereas Berkeley denied the existence of all objects as they exist in themselves, he himself maintained the reality of objects of sense (Walker 110). This obviously cannot be true, however, since Berkeley “is confident of the reality of a multitude of finite active spirits, and also of God, who causes our perceptions” (Walker 110). The difference between Kant and Berkeley is really that whereas Berkeley proposed a mechanism (the reality of God) by which the veracity of perceptual data could be insured, Kant did not (Walker 110).

Walker does seem, however, to view somewhat favorably Kant’s argument that Berkeley “could not distinguish reality from illusion because he did not see that space (and time) were a priori respresentations [sic] and thus laid ‘nothing…a priori at the ground of appearances’” (Walker 122). Kant’s argument seems to rest upon the notion that Berkeley, as an empiricist, cannot infer any distinction between reality and illusion based on an a priori principle. But Berkeley is not a pure empiricist as Walker himself points out: “[According to Berkeley,] it appears that our knowledge of spirits and particularly of God is a kind of intuitive apprehension that cannot properly be called empirical.” (Walker 110). One can go much farther than this statement, however. Consider the following excerpts from Berkeley’s Dialogues:

“I know what I mean by the terms I and myself; and I know this immediately, or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound.”

“All the notion I have of God, is obtained by reflecting on my own soul…”

“And though I perceive [God] not by sense, yet I have a notion of him, or know him by reflection and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas…”

“From the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of God, and of all created things in the mind of God.” (Berkeley 65).

Is Berkeley a rationalist? He appears to believe that from certain self-evident intuited truths (Berkeley’s a priori principle) one can infer the existence of God, of other finite spirits, and ultimately of all created things in the mind of God. In other words, even the reality of our perceptions can be rationally inferred from an a priori principle. In a sense, for Berkeley all sensory experience is a species of divine revelation and therefore a priori.

VI. Conclusion

The confusion which arose concerning Berkeley’s idealism can be traced to the misunderstanding of uncomprehending critics who never followed his arguments beyond the claim that the essence of things is in their perception (Turbayne 101). The same was true of Kant in his time (Turbayne 101). It is difficult to present a coherent argument which dispels all doubt concerning the relationship between Berkeley and Kant— there is even much disagreement between scholars convinced that there is a strong connection between the two. This situation is understandable when one considers the depth of genius with which one is-attempting to contend. It seems evident, however, through the work of modern scholarship that the similarities between Kant’s transcendental idealism and Berkeley’s immaterialism far outnumber the differences.

WORKS CITED

Berkeley, George. Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1979.

Turbayne, Colin Murray. “Kant’s Relation to Berkeley,” Kant Studies Today. Ed. Lewis W. Beck. La Salle: Open Court, 1969.

Walker, R. C. S. “Idealism: Kant and Berkeley.” Essays on Berkeley. Ed. John Foster and Howard Robinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985

I. Introduction

Although it is commonly held by scholars that Kant’s transcendental idealism and Berkeley’s immaterialism represent two very different schools of philosophical thought, it is the opinion of many modern scholars that this view typifies a misunderstanding of both philosophers. Specifically, it appears that despite Kant’s ardent protests to the contrary, his transcendental idealism is essentially equivalent to Berkeley’s immaterialism and that Berkeley did indeed propose and support a concept of empirical realism similar to that proposed by Kant.

II. The Unity of Transcendental Idealism and Immaterialism

The similarity between Kant’s transcendental idealism and Berkeley’s immaterialism is demonstrated by Colin Murray Turbayne, author of an essay entitled Kant’s Relation to Berkeley, through a comparison of their primary assertions. According to Turbayne, both Kant and Berkeley begin by asserting the realist position that external bodies exist independently of our perception of them:

Kant: “[The transcendental realists]…maintain the absolute reality of space and time, whether as subsistent or only as inherent (A39 )…wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by themselves, and independently of the senses (A369).”

[I have maintained Turbayne's original scheme of referencing his citations throughout. In this case A refers to the first edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason while B refers to the second edition.]

Berkeley: “[The philosophers assert] the being of an absolute space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense (Prin. 116).”

They then proceed to attack the same doctrine by denying its implication of primary and secondary qualities. Both men claim that to infer such a distinction amongst qualities is to venture beyond the limits of possible experience (Turbayne 94-96):

Kant: “[Transcendental realism involves] the transcendental illusion, by which metaphysics has hitherto been deceived and led to the childish endeavor of catching at bubbles, because appearances, which are mere ideas, were taken for things in themselves, (Proleg. 13. Cf. A369, 491).”

Berkeley: “When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself (Prin. 23).”

Turbayne also notes that both philosophers admit that the notion of scepticism follows from their arguments (Turbayne 96-98):

Kant: “Transcendental realism inevitably falls into difficulties, and finds itself obliged to give way to empirical idealism, in that it regards the objects of outer sense as something distinct from the senses themselves (A371). [On this view] it is quite impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on the idea which is in us (A378. Cf. Proleg. 49).”

Berkeley: “All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas…So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists…We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things (Prin. 87-8).”

What Kant refers to as dogmatic idealism, and Berkeley calls the deepest scepticism, is the denial of the reality of external objects (Turbayne 97-98). Both philosophers affirm their opposition to this form of denial but also deny the “absolute reality of bodies in absolute space” (Turbayne 97). Although Kant mentions at one point that dogmatic idealists, whom he opposes, deny the existence of matter, he also defines matter in the same statement as “only a species of ideas” (Turbayne 97). The problem here is obviously one of terminology. Berkeley himself states in the Dialogues that “if by material substance is meant only sensible body, that which is seen and felt…then I am more certain of matter’s existence than you, or any other philosopher, pretend to be” (Berkeley 71).

Turbayne continues his discussion by demonstrating that both Kant and Berkeley use similar methods to attempt to destroy the edifice of scepticism they have erected. Both, for instance, posit that the essence of ideas is in their perception (Turbayne 99):

Kant: “Sceptical idealism thus constrains us to have recourse to the only refuge still open, namely, the ideality of all appearances…for we cannot be sentient of what is outside ourselves, but only of what is in us (A378). All appearances are not in themselves things; they are nothing but ideas, and cannot exist outside our mind (A492 ).”

Berkeley: “The philosophers…being of the opinion that…the things immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in the mind (Hylas III).”

Both also then extend the domain of perception to include all external objects (Turbayne 100):

Kant: “External bodies are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my ideas, the objects of which are something only through these ideas. Apart from them they are nothing (A370. Cf. A491, Proleg . 13).”

Berkeley: “As to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi , nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them (Prin. 3).”

Although this appears “to plunge both philosophers even deeper into scepticism,” Kant and Berkeley then propose the absolute reality of perceptions (Turbayne 101 – 102):

Kant: “I leave things as we obtain them by the senses their reality (Proleg. 13). In order to arrive at the reality of outer objects, I have just as little need to resort to inference as I have in regard to the reality of the object of my inner sense….For in both cases alike the objects are nothing but ideas, the immediate perception of which is at the same time sufficient proof of their reality (A371).”

Berkeley: “I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them (Hylas III). I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel….Those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves (Hylas III). If by material substance is meant only sensible body, that which is seen and felt…then I am more certain of matter’s existence than you, or any other philosopher, pretend to by (Hylas III).”

As Turbayne describes it, “having consorted with idealism in order to refute transcendental realism…the two men now divorce themselves from it. Accordingly, this final step in the central argument constitutes Kant’s and Berkeley’s refutation of idealism or scepticism and, by the same token, their proof of the external world. From it, emerges their empirical realism.” (102).

 (continued)

The following is a brief review of philosopher David Hume’s famous meditation on human understanding.]

Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding attempts to determine to what extant man can come to knowledge of the world in which he lives. Hume begins by discussing the origin of ideas and the nature of their associations. According to Hume, all perceptions of the mind can be divided into two categories, ideas and impressions. These types of perception are distinguished from one another in that the former are “less forcible” and associated with memory while the latter are “more lively” and experienced directly without reflection. Hume also argues that no ideas are innate since all ideas which appear not to merge with the content of one’s experience can be reduced to mere associations of simpler ideas derived from experience.

Hume also believed that all associations between ideas could be described through the application of three principles: Resemblance, Contiguity, and Cause and Effect. According to Hume. the definition of the principle of Resemblance is rendered in the notion that “a picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original;” the definition of the principle of Contiguity in the notion that “the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others:” and the definition of Cause and Effect in the notion that “if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it.”

Also according to Hume, since all knowledge is acquired through experience, humans can at best assume only the probability that a certain effect will result from some prior cause. Likewise, the skepticism that Hume’s philosophy entails can only be overcome by acquiescing to human nature’s instinctive habit to judge according to its understanding of cause and effect relationships and not according “to the fallacious deductions of our reason.” Concerning the issue of freewill and determinism, Hume seems to believe that the human will is capable of a limited form of choice wherein certain determining factors are selected over others. Concerning belief in miracles, Hume paradoxically holds that although it is not reasonable to believe the report of a miracle, nonetheless they can be accepted on the basis of faith if one is willing to subvert “all the principles of his understanding” and “believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.”